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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

M;CHAEL PATRICK PAYNE,
J\' and through his
•ouardian ad Litem,
JOHN MICHAEL PAYNE,
iOHN MICHAEL PAYNE and
orEPHANIE PAYNE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
'IS,

GARTH G. MYERS, M.D.;
JOSEPH P. KESLER, M.D.;
THE STATE OF UTAH AND
!IANDICAPPED CHI LOREN'S
SERVICE; and THE DIVIS ION
)f HEALTH OF THE STATE OF
t'TAH,

No.

19218

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs against defendants
Kesler, the State of Utah Handicapped Children's Service

~yers.

•nd the

Division of Health of the State of Utah, wherein

~l31ntiffs

~hvs1~1ans,
'·v~e

~

provided negligent advice to plaintiffs John Michael

3nd Stephanie Payne, husband and wife, regarding their pro-

~" 1 1siry

\s

claim that defendants Myers and Kesler, who are both

lo have a child suffering from a severe genetic disease.

result of the negligent advice, plaintiffs John Michael

-1-

Payne and Stephanie Payne allege that they became the parents 01
a second child suffering from a severe genetic disease, the

sa~

genetic disease from which their first child also suffered.
Plaintiffs John Michael Payne and Stephanie Payne seek damages
for wrongful birth and plaintiff Michael Patrick Payne seeks
damages for wrongful life.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Motions for summary judgment by all defendants were considered by the district court, and summary judgments were entered
in favor of the State of Utah and Handicapped Children's Service
and the Division of Health of the State of Utah against plaintiffs John Michael Payne and Stephanie Payne on the grounds that
they did not timely serve a notice of claim against the State of
Utah defendants pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §63-30-12, and
the motions for summary judgment by defendants Myers and Kesler
were granted as to all claims by all plaintiffs.

The motion for

summary judgment by the State of Utah defendants as to the claims
on behalf of Michael Patrick Payne was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's decision
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Myers and Kesler
as to all claims of all named plaintiffs.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 2, 1975, plaintiffs John Michael Payne and
-1~phanie

Payne gave birth to their first child, Matthew Payne.

;hortly after the child's birth, he showed signs of a serious
1

eurological impairment and suffered numerous other physical

Jroblems.

He was subsequently treated by defendants Kesler and

1.1yers, both of whom failed to diagnose Matthew Payne's neurological and other physical problems as being related to genetic
disease.
In 1977, Matthew was seen and treated by defendants
Kesler and Myers at the Handicapped Children's Service of the
State of Utah.

In that period of time, plaintiffs John Payne and

Stephanie Payne requested genetic counseling on several occasions
:rom Kesler and/or Myers as well as counseling and advice
regarding the possibility that Matthew's illnesses were related
ro a genetic disease.

Both parents were anxious to have another

child, but they did not want to run the risk of having a second
child suffer in the same way as their first.

The parents speci-

:1cally requested that they be given genetic counseling by one
"'Jalified to perform the same, so as to minimize the risk.

The

-;ar·ents specifically informed the defendants that they were
3nx1ous to have other children when they requested the genetic
_lJunsel ing.

An appointment to meet with a doctor trained in genetic
•Junse ling, Dr. Robert Fineman, was set up for plaintiffs by
Jefendants for some time in the fall of 1977, but Dr. Fineman was
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unable to keep the appointment, and plaintiffs were notified bv
telephone that the appointment was canceled.

Subsequently,

plaintiffs met with defendants Kesler and Myers, and John Payne
and Stephanie Payne advised Kesler and Myers that the appointmenc
for genetic counseling had been canceled.

Mr. and Mrs. Payne

again reiterated their concerns at this time regarding the need
for genetic counseling, so that they would feel assured that it
was safe to have another child.

This last appointment with

Kesler and Myers was probably held some time in the fall of 1977,
or at least before March of 1978.

During that visit, both Kesler

and Myers advised Mr. and Mrs. Payne that, although another genetic counseling appointment could be set up, neither Dr. Kesler
nor Dr. Myers felt that such counseling was necessary.
Furthermore, the doctors advised Mr. and Mrs. Payne that it was
safe to have another child, and that Mrs. Payne need not be concerned about any genetic problems related to having another
child.
In reliance on the assurances given by Drs. Kesler and
Myers, Mr. and Mrs. Payne began a course of conduct which would
ultimately result in the birth of their second child, plaintiff
Michael Patrick Payne, on January 27, 1979.

The course of con-

duct taken by the Paynes in reliance on Ors. Myers' and Kesler's
advice included a visit by Mrs. Payne on February 14, 1978, to
her obstetrician/gynecologist, Dr. R. Kent Gibbs.

At that oft.

visit, Dr. Gibbs removed the intrauterine birth control devise
(IUD) from Mrs. Payne.

[Gibbs Depo.
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p.

20]

Mrs. Payne con-

t,;cred Dr. Gibbs again on March 13, 1978.

[Gibbs Depo., p. 21)

"e IUD was removed so that the Paynes could conceive another
~niJd.
p~t

As indicated above, the second child, plaintiff Michael

rick Payne, was born on January 27, 1979.

.hdrged for the services provided by Dr.
2 verall

The Paynes were

Gibbs as part of their

bill for services relating to obstetrical care and deli-

very of the baby in the amount of $345.

[Gibbs Depo. Exhibit A)

shortly after his birth, Michael developed the same neurological
impairments and defects from which his brother suffers.
A few months after Michael's birth, both children were
seen by a geneticist who upon examining them almost immediately
diagnosed Pelizaeus-Merzbacher disease as the probable genetic
impairment from which the boys suffer.
Pelizaeus-Merzbacher in its classical form is an herediLary genetic, slowly progressive brain disorder with no known
Lreatment or cure.

Early symptoms include rotating eye movements

and jerking and rolling head movements or tremor.
~ew

In the first

years of life, there is a slow progression of the neurologi-

:al signs and a decline of the intellectual or mental level.
Ultimately, the symptoms of the disease include severe spastic1ty, loss of sight, severe involvement of speech and finally
vegetation and death in the second or third decade.
~!:.•

Renier, et

"Connatal Pelizaeus-Merzbacher Disease with Congenital

''r1·Jor in Two Maternal Cousins", Acta Neuropathologica ( 1982);
'•a1man & Wright, The Practice of Pediatric Neurology, p. 729
g7

s) •
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As part of their complaint in this action, plaintiffs
John Michael Payne and Stephanie Payne seek as damages, among
other things, the "[c]osts incident to the pregnancy and delivet
of plaintiff Michael Patrick Payne in excess of $1,000:"

[Tr.

The lower court's decision to grant summary judgment

i
in

favor of defendants Myers and Kesler was based on its interpreta

0

tion of Utah Code Annotated S63-30-4, as amended in 1978, to
absolutely preclude personal liability of a governmental employee
for said employee's negligent conduct.

As set forth more fully

below, plaintiffs take the position that said statute is inapplicable to this case because plaintiffs' cause of action arose
prior to the effective date of the statute, and/or because the
lower court's interpretation of the statute as applied to the
facts of this case was wrong and violates sound public policy,
and/or the statute is unconstitutional.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §63-30-4, AS AMENDED,
CANNOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO BAR
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS MYERS
AND KESLER BECAUSE SAID DEFENDANTS'
NEGLIGENCE OCCURRED AND PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS
AROSE PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE
STATUTE.
A.

U.C.A. §63-30-4 As Amended, Is To Be Given
Prospective Effect Only.

Utah Code Annotated §63-30-4 was amended in 1978.

The

legislature expressed its intent when it amended said statute ~
stating that it was applicable only after the effective date of

-6-

ne amendment.

Said section states, in part:

The remedy against a governmental entity or
its employee for an injury caused by an act
or omission which occurs during the performance of such employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of
authority is, after the effective date of
this Act, exclusive of any other civil
action or proceeding by reason of the same
subject matter against the employee or the
estate of the employee whose act or
omission gave rise to the claim, unless the
employee acted or failed to act through
gross negligence, fraud or malice.
[emphasis added)
Section 63-30-4, as amended, became effective on March
JQ, 1978.

Laws of Utah 1978 at 91.

It cannot be applied

retroactively to events, occurrences or transactions occurring
before March 30, 1978.
In addition to the specific language in §63-30-4
~recluding

its retroactive application, the general rule of

;tatutory construction is that statutes are to be applied
prospectively only unless the statute specifically states that it
is to have retroactive application.

Utah has codified this

1eneral rule in U.C.A. §68-3-3 which states:

"No part of these

cevised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."
§63-30-4 cannot be applied retroactively because it does not

expressly declare itself to be retroactive.
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B.

A Statute Cannot Be Ap~lied Retroactively If
Existing Substantive Rights Are Terminated
By the Statute.

Courts have applied an exception to the rule that
statutes are to be applied prospectively only, in cases where t:,_
statute involved procedural rights only, or where the statute
dealt only with a clarification or the interpretation of a prior
statute.

See 82 C.J.S. Statutes §416.

In a case involving a

constitutional challenge of certain "children's rights" statutes,
but which did not turn on the issue of retroactivity, the Utah
Supreme Court, in the case of In Re J. P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah
1982), explained the general rule and the exception as noted
above regarding retroactivity in Footnote 4 to the main opinion
as follows:
The well-established general rule is that
statutes not expressly retroactive should
only be applied prospectively • • • •
Exceptions to this general rule have been
found where an amendment's effect was
'procedural' or 'remedial.'
Foil v.
Ballinger, Utah, 601 P.2d 144 (1979)
(clarified statutory notice provision and
changed 'commenced' to 'initiated'); Petty
v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948)
(added new categories of suits where jury
is advisory); Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36
Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909) (empowered
courts to make additional findings after
entry of judgment).
In Foil v. Ballinger,
601 P.2d at 151 we quoted with approval a
passage from Okland Constr. Co. v.
Industial Comm., • . . which stated that a
statute or amendment may be retroactively
applied where it 'deals only with clarification or amplification as to how the law
should have been understood prior to its
enactment. '
The 1981 Amendment to §78-3(a)-48(l)(a)
did not make a merely procedural change

or clarify how the 1980 statute should
have been understood originally.
Although the amendment does not alter the
subsection's controlling principle • • •
it deletes one of the two criteria for
determining the child's best interests,
clarifies the other, and adds seven new
criteria. The additions are extensive,
more than doubling the subsection's
length. Changes of this magnitude do
not fit within the relative! narrow
exception illustrated above.
emphasis
added]
(648 P.2d at 1369-1370]
In the instant case, the 1978 change to §63-30-4 was
extensive and did not affect only procedural rights.
amendment clarify or interpret prior law.

Nor did the

The amendment to

563-30-4, effectively destroys plaintiffs' common law right to
file suit and pursue an action against Ors. Kesler and Myers for
simple negligence, which is clearly a substantive right not
•ithin the exceptions set forth in In Re J. P., supra.

The

amendment not only affects substantive rights, it purports to
t0tally extinguish basic, substantive, common law rights to hold
'reating physicians personally liable for their medical malpract1ce.
The case of Allen v. Fisher, 118 Ariz. 95, 574 P.2d 1314
1977), helps define the distinction between substantive and pro-

:edural rights.

The court stated:

While there is no precise definition of
either term, it is generally agreed that a
substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural one
prescribes the method of enforcing such
rights or obtaining redress.
(574 P.2d at
1315]
The case of Kolodejchuk v. Lucier, 52 Or.App. 81, 630

-9-

P.2d 889 (1981), provides an insightful explanation of the
retroactivity question, distinguishing between procedural and
substantive rights:
The general rule in this state is that,
unless the legislature indicates otherwise,
'procedural' or 'remedial' statutes are
applied retroactively and 'substantive'
statutes are not • . • • These labels are
commonly applied, however, only after a
determination as to which effect should be
given • • • • The focal question is whether
the new statute affects legal rights and
obligations arising out of past transactions.
If it does, then the statute is
substantive and normally will not be
applied retroactively. [emphasis added]
(630 P.2d at 891]
In the case of Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P.2d 689 (1954), the Utah
Supreme Court made a similar statement:
A statute is not made retroactive merely
because it draws on antecedent facts for
its operation • • • • A law is retrospective,
in its legal sense, which takes away or
impairs vested rights acquired under
existing laws, or creates a new obligation,
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already passed. [emphasis
added] (268 P. 2d at 692]
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a
cause of action is a property right which the legislature canno
take away retroactively.

In Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation

Co. v. Dist. Court of Salt Lake County, 99 Utah 527, 104 P.2d l
(1940), the court stated:
With reference to a right of action it is
stated in 6 RCL under Title,
'Constitutional Law', . . . as follows: 'A
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vested right of action is property in the
same sense in which tangible things are
property, and is equally protected against
arbitrary interference, and whether it
springs from contract or the principles of
the common law, it is not competent for the
legislature to take it away.'
And this Court has approved and affirmed
this doctrine in the case Halling v.
Industrial Comm. of Utah, et al., 71 Utah
112, 263 P. 78, citing 2d Cooley's Const.
Law 8th Ed., •
[104 P. 2d at 360)
The recent case of State of Utah v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998
iJtah 1982), contains language indicating that the statute in
effect at the time the complaint is filed controls the litigat1on.

However, the issue

in~

was concerned entirely with

the question of which statute applied for purposes of determining
the procedural rights of the parties for employee grievances.

No

substantive rights were involved, and even though the court
referred, in dicta, to a gene.ral rule that the statute in effect
at the time the complaint is filed applies to both procedural and

substantive rights, it is clear that the court was applying a
procedural statute retroactively, and did not intend to expand

:he general rule of law that a statute cannot be applied retroactively to cut off substantive rights.

This is evidenced by the

c0urt's statement in the second to the last paragraph of the
'Jptnion:

On remand of this case, the Personnel
Management Act will control the administrative proceeding since it does not affect
any common law or vested rights, and since
jurisdiction of the district court had not
yet attached at the time the Employees'
Grievance Procedure Act was repealed.
[emphasis added) [656 P.2d at 1002)
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deci 1e •hether the amend-

the defendant '.Tledical care

into evidence any benefits the plaintiff was

his

inJuries

·•at this part of
-
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the amended statute aDolished the

rule and allowed

s.,ur~e
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from collateral sources.

The court

the medical malpractice statute changed

of damages available to a plaintiff

in a malpractice

. " and that such a change was a substantive one and as a
•he amended statute could not be applied retroactively.
urt.

stated:
A rule affecting the measure of damages
is a substantive right, Prank Bricoe Co.,
Inc. v. Rutgers State Univ. & College of
Med1c1ne and Denistry of N.J .. et al., 130
:-<.J. Super. 493, 327 A.2d 687 (19"4\. and a
change in the law affecting the measure of
an lnJured person's right of recovery cannot be applied retroactively.
[574 P.2d at
1316]

Just
11-~

as

in Allen,

so in the

instant case,

the amendment

•!ttect1vely changes the measure of :iamages available
1overnment employee for his
If

··~~~4ence.

·~:

..

-1·~'1_.:i.t_•

1:1

the

his

plaint1~ts'

;Jers(Jnal

r1~ht

:-apaclt'f

'3S•-".

ts

to sue and recover
aool1~hed,

:.;.

':.hen

'i63-J0-29.

the

This is another basis for holding that the amendment to the
statute affects a substantive right and cannot be applied
retroactively.
The only question then is what are the critical
occurrences in the instant case which determine whether plaintiffs held a substantive right before the amendment took effect.
This issue will be discussed under the next subheading.
C.

Plaintiffs Acquired Substantive Rights Prior To The
Effective Date of §63-30-4, As Amended, Because The
Physicians' Negligent Advice Was Given, And
Plaintiffs Relied Thereon And Incurred Medical
Expense Obligations As A Result Of Said Negligent
Advice, Prior To The Effective Date of §63-30-4, As
Amended.

It is clear from the facts of this case that the amended
statute did not become effective until after the date of the
alleged negligent acts committed by defendants Myers and Kesler.
Although neither John Payne nor Stephanie Payne could place a
specific date on the visit when Dr. Kesler and Dr. Myers advised
them that Matthew Payne's disease was not genetically related a~
that the Paynes could have another child without concern for
genetic problems, both Mr. and Mrs. Payne stated that it was in
the fall of 1977 that the visit occurred.

Furthermore, the last

entry or medical visit found in the Handicapped Children's
Service Record before the birth of the second child is October I,
1977.

Consequently, the alleged negligence of the doctors

occurred prior to March 30, 1978, the effective date of §63-3iJ-"
as amended.
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Furthermore, services provided by Mrs. Payne's obstetri_1an. Dr. R.

Kent Gibbs,

in removing the IUD from Mrs. Payne

0 1Jo~ing her to become pregnant, were provided on February 14,
•q7R, approximately one and a half months before the effective

·Jate of the amended statute.

At such time as those services were

cendered, the Paynes incurred an obligation to pay for the services of Dr. Gibbs, which services would never have been provided
nor the obligation incurred, had defendants Myers and Kesler not
negligently advised Paynes that it was safe to have another child
without concern for genetic ramifications.
Plaintiffs contend, therefore, that since the negligence
occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment to
§63-30-4, and since the Paynes incurred obligations for medical
services as a result of said negligence, also prior to the effeclive date of S63-30-4, that their substantive rights arose prior
to the effective date of the statute.

The amendment is therefore

not applicable because applying it to this case would constitute
a retroactive application of the statute which is expressly prohibited as discussed above.
The critical occurrences in the instant case, which give
rise to plaintiffs'

substantive rights prior to the effective

Jote of §63-30-4, are the negligent advice of defendants Myers

•nd Kesler and the subsequent reliance by plaintiffs John Michael
"1vr1e

and Stephanie Payne on said negligent advice in obligating

~emselves
Js

for medical services provided in removing the IUD so

"o allow Mrs. Payne to become pregnant.
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Both of these criti-

cal occurrences took place prior to the effective date of the
amendment to S63-30-4.

The substantive law in effect as of the

date of those critical occurrences is the law that must be
applied to this case because those occurrences created a substan"
tive right in favor of Paynes which cannot be retroactively taken
away from them by an amendment to S63-30-4.
Defendants will undoubtedly argue that plaintiffs' right;
or cause of action did not accrue until either the date the
was conceived or the date the baby was born.

This court should

reject that argument for the following two reasons, which
enumerated in more detail below.

ba~

will~

First, it is clear that the law

applicable to a cause of action is that law in effect at the time
of the occurrence or transaction that gives rise to the rights anc
liabilities of the parties.

The "occurrence" giving rise to the

liability of the defendant doctors was the negligent advice

whi~

was given prior to the effective date of the amendment to

§63-30-4.

Second, once the plaintiffs incurred any detriment or

obligation, regardless of how small it may have been, which obligation was a direct result of the defendants'

negligence,

plaintiffs' cause of action arose and any consequences subsequer'
to the date that cause of action arose are a part of the origina
cause of action and relate back to that same cause of action.
The general rule has previously been stated that a
statute will not be applied retroactively if it affects the
substantive rights of the parties.

In most cases,

it will

generally be the case that the substantive rights are determined
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1

,,1p 1,

the cause of action accrues.

,;_ 3 ted

It has further generally been

that a cause of action accrues when a party could first

,.~inta1n

a successful suit.
Medical malpractice actions, however, are somewhat dif-

rerent than the average negligence case.
0 ctions,

the injury occurs at the same time, or very closely in

;_ime, to the act of negligence.
1n

In most negligence

This is not necessarily the case

a medical malpractice action, especially one involving negli-

qent medical advice.

As in the instant case, the negligent

idvice may be given before any concrete actions are taken in
reliance upon that advice.

But the negligent advice is the con-

Juct that gives rise to liability on the part of the doctor.

The

:ights and liabilities of the parties, therefore, must be
~•sured

by the law in effect at the time of the actions of the

.Joctors which give rise to later liability.
Even the Utah Medical Malpractice Act recognizes that
the treatment by the physician should be given some operative
effect.

Section 78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, states, in per-

'inent part:
No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered the injury, whichever
first occurs, but not to exceed four
years after the date of the alleged act,
omission, neglect or occurrence • • • •
[emphasis added]
This section recognizes that medical malpractice cases
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are often different than the average tort case.

It can be

so~

time between the time of the negligence and the time of
discovery, and the Medical Malpractice Act therefore provides
codification of the •discovery rule".

But even though the

discovery rule is applied, allowing two years from the time that
the patient discovers or should have discovered an injury within
which to bring suit, the legislature also recognized the operative effect of the doctors' negligence and provides for an outside limit on the time for bringing a cause of action, that

bei~

four years after the alleged act, omission, neglect or
occurrence.
In the instant case, the negligence occurred some time
in the fall of 1977, clearly prior to the date of the amendment
to S63-30-4.

Thus, the substantive rights of the parties arose

prior to the effective date of the amendment, which right cannot
be extinguished at a later date by an amendment to §63-30-4.
It is further interesting to note that the Utah
Legislature in 1983 amended the notice provision of the
Governmental Immunity Act, §63-30-11(1) in 1983 to read:

"A

claim is deemed to arise when the statute of limitations that
would apply if the claim were against a private person commences
to run." Utah Code Annotated §63-30-11(1)

(Inter. Supp. 19831.

Since the four-year medical malpractice statute of limitations
begins to run as of the date of negligence, the Legislature has
here recognized the potential for a right of some type (cla1ml ,_arise as of the date of the negligence.
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Furthermore, as indicated above, plaintiffs incurred an
11gation for medical services to Dr. Gibbs for removal of the
1ilD

and for other services provided prior to the effective date

·f tJ1e amendment to §63-30-4.

These services were clearly

eldted to the Paynes' desire to have another child, and would

not have been incurred if defendants Kesler and Myers had not
assuced plaintiffs that they could conceive and have another
child without fear of any genetic problems.

Although the actual

Dill for services rendered may not have been received by Mr. and
Mrs. Payne until after their second child was delivered, that
bill includes the costs of all obstetrical care provided by Dr.
Gibbs dating back to the time the IUD was removed.

The obliga-

tion to pay for the services rendered in removing the IUD was
incurred at the time those services were rendered.

If the Paynes

had learned prior to the date of conception of the genetic
disease, and had terminated any attempts at having another child,
they clearly would have been responsible for the services pro1ided by Dr.

Gibbs up to that point in time.

Their obligation

to pay for those services would have given them a right of action
Dack against Drs. Myers and Kesler because the obligation was

incurred as a direct result of the negligent advice provided by
~ ~s

ler and Myers.
That a patient becomes obligated to pay for services

~.1dered by a

"'

physician as the services are rendered is clearly

forth in the case of In Re Shoptaw's Estate, 343 P.2d 740

iWash.

1959).

This case involved the issue of whether a
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doctor's bill for services rendered during the last 11 months~:
a person's life took priority over a claim of the United States
for back taxes where both were made claims against the deceasec
person's estate.

The Washington Supreme Court discussed the

issue of whether the doctor's bills were in fact debts due from
the deceased and stated:
The test is whether, if the decedent had
recovered from her illness, she would have
been personally liable for the payment of
those obligations. The general rule is
that the patient is liable, either under
express or implied contract, for the medical services rendered to him. The
patient's liability arises as t~physi
cian's services are rendered on his behalf
during his 11fet1me. After the patient's
death, his physician's claim for such services relates to a debt due from the decedent •
[emphasis added] [343 P. 2d at
742]
This same general rule was referred to in Fugitt v. Myers, 9
Wash.App. 523, 513 P.2d 297 (1973), wherein the court stated:
[T]he general rule is that a patient is
liable, under either an express or implied
contract, for the medical services rendered
to him, and after the patient's death the
attending physician's claim for such services is a debt due from the decedent's
estate.
[513 P.2d at 299]
Cleveland Anesthesia Group v. Krulak, 135 N.E. 685 !Oh1',
1956), was a case where the Anesthesia Group brought suit to
recover the cost of providing anesthetic services to the
defendant's wife while she was in the hospital.

The trial co 1"

entered judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.
The appellate court affirmed.

Regarding the obligation for the

anesthetic services provided, the court stated:
-20-

It is well established in this state that
a husband is bound to pay for medical services rendered to his wife as necessities,
and that the services of a surgeon, in conjunction with the services of one specializing in anesthesiology in the
performance of an operation, are indeed
necessities.

Under the facts shown here to exist, the
husband may be held liable. At common law,
when one secures services to be rendered,
whether to himself or to another, there
arises an implied contract to pay for such
services.
[135 N.E.2d at 687]
The above-referenced cases clearly establish that once
the Paynes received the services from Dr. Gibbs in February of
1378, which services were only obtained by Paynes because of the

advice given them by defendants Myers and Kesler, the Paynes
immediately incurred an obligation to pay Dr. Gibbs for those
services.
~yers

As was subsequently shown, the advice given by Drs.

and Kesler was negligent because it was not genetically

;afe for Mrs. Payne to become pregnant again, and the obligation
incurred by Paynes to Dr. Gibbs constituted a cause of action as
1f the date that

obligation was incurred {February 14, 1978).

r1>1s 0bligation is a damage

incurred by Mr. and Mrs. Payne caused

"Y the negligent advice of Drs. Myers and Kesler.
t1an

This cause of

for damages arose prior to the effective date of the

1e11dment to §63-30-4.

Therefore, the plaintiffs had a cause of

1:t1on prior to the amendment to §63-30-4.
Once the cause of action arose when Paynes incurred the
1nligation to or. Gibbs,

then any additional damages incurred by
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Paynes, which are foreseeable and which are the natural result
defendants' negligent advice, are recoverable by Paynes as part
of the basic cause of action.

It is a well-settled principle or

law that a cause of action cannot be split and that all damages
relating to a cause of action, whether present or future, must
joined in the same lawsuit.

~

22 Am.Jur. 2d, Damages, 526 states'

The law does not permit the owner of a
single or entire cause of action or an
entire or indivisible demand, without the
consent of the person against whom the
cause or demand exists, to divide or split
that cause or demand so as to make it the
subject of several actions. The entire
cause must be determined in one action, and
if suit is brought for a part of the claim,
the judgment obtained precludes a second
action for any remaining portion of the
claim, even though the form of the second
action is not identical with the first or
different grounds of relief are set forth
in the second suit. Hence, in estimating
the pecuniary loss which a plaintiff has
sustained as a result of the defendant's
tort or breach of contract, all the consequences of the injury, future as well as
past, are to be taken into consideration:
the recovery, if any, must be for all the
injuries and all damages resulting
therefrom, whether past, present, or
prospective, once and for all.
In cases
coming within this rule, a recovery may be
had for prospective damages which are
reasonably certain to accrue.
[22 Am.Jur. 2d
at 46-47]
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court quoted approvingly fr~
a Minnesota case in Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining
Mining Co., 13 Utah 108, 191 P.2d 612 (1948), and stated:
A personal injury received at the hands of
a wrongdoer constitutes but one right of
action.
It cannot be divided into several
parts to accord with the elements of dama-

-22-

&

ges recoverable therefor.
It presents a
single controversy to be settled in a
single action.
[191 P.2d at 619]
The Masich case also made a statement relevant to the
It stated:
Obviously when an act excludes causes of
action arising before the act is passed, no
valid reason exists for denying the
employee his right of action for the
injuries sustained before passage of the
act.
[Id. at 623]
~involved

the interpretation of Utah's Occupational Disease

Disability Law and whether that Act was the exclusive remedy for
an employee partially disabled by silicosis where the Act only
provided compensation for employees totally disabled by the
In light of the court's statement, quoted above, that a
personal injury is one right of action and cannot be divided, the
court's statement regarding causes of action arising before
passage of the Act is directly applicable to the instant case •
.~ <.·a use of act ion arose when Paynes'

lbligation.

incurred the medical expense

That constituted an injury, and since the cause of

ection for personal injury cannot be divided up, all subsequent
1amages flowing naturally from the original cause of action
celate back to that date prior to passage of the amendment to
)n l-3lJ-4,

Clearly, when Ors. Myers and Kesler gave plaintiffs the
<rl•1,P

that they could conceive and have another child without

ear 0f genetic problems, they could foresee that plaintiffs
•'ulj take

the steps necessary to conceive and have a child.
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It

was also clearly foreseeable that if the advice was not proper,
that another genetically diseased child could be born and thar
plaintiffs would incur expenses and damages as a result thereof
Therefore, any and all damages that occurred following
the initial date that a cause of action was formed are a part of
that cause of action and are recoverable by plaintiffs against
defendants.

Since medical expense obligations were incurred

prior to the effective date of the amendment, all future damages
to plaintiffs relate back to that date at the very least.
In addition, the determination of the time when the
plaintiffs suffered appreciable and measurable damages, which
would give rise to a cause of action, is a question of fact which
would preclude summary judgment.
P.2d 1221 (Wash.

Haslund v. City of Seattle, 547

1976).

In summary, plaintiff~' position is that their substantive rights were in existence prior to the effective date of
§63-30-4, as amended, because defendants' negligence occurred
before and plaintiffs incurred obligations before the statute
became effective.

If the court were to apply §63-30-4, as

amended, to this case and eliminate any potential liability of
Drs. Kesler and Myers as individuals, then the court would be
giving §63-30-4 an impermissible retroactive application.
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D.

The Law In Effect As Of The Date Of Negligence
And/Or Date Paynes First Incurred Medical Expenses
Applies To This Case.

It has been shown above, that plaintiffs held substanrive rights prior to the date §63-30-4,
t, re,

as amended, became effec-

Therefore, S63-30-4 as it existed prior to being amended

1s the statute applicable to the facts of this case.

Prior to

the 1978 amendment, the statute stated:
Nothing contained in this Act, unless specifically provided, is to be construed as
an admission or denial of liability or
responsibility insofar as governmental
entities are concerned. Wherein immunity
from suit is waived by this Act, consent to
be sued is granted and liability of the
entity shall be determined as if the entity
were a private person.
Obviously, the statute prior to the 1978 amendment does
not bar an action against an employee of a governmental entity in
his personal capacity, and in fact, makes no reference whatsoever
to the status of governmental employees.
Further, the Utah Supreme Court held in Frank v. State,
613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), that the Governmental Immunity Act had

r10 application to individuals, and that a psychologist working
•ith the University of Utah Medical Center alleged to have been
negligent in his treatment of a patient was not afforded immunity
,_111der the discretionary/ministerial analysis applied to agents of
':1µ

government.
Thus, under the law applicable to the facts of the

1stant case, Drs. Kesler and Myers can be held personally liable
[,Jc-

their negligent conduct to plaintiffs.
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This law should be

applied and the court should reverse the lower court's summari
judgment in favor of said defendants.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS MYERS
AND KESLER ARE NOT BARRED BY THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Assuming, arguendo, that Utah Code Annotated §63-30-4,
as amended in 1978, does apply to the facts of the instant case,
plaintiffs contend that said statute was never intended to bar
their claims against Drs. Kesler and Myers as individuals.
A.

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) Does
Apply To The Facts Of This Case.

~c

Plaintiffs acknowledge this court's recent decision in
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), which case contaiM

statements to the effect that the Governmental Immunity Act arnenc·
ments have extinguished any personal liability of employees of
governmental entities for simple negligence.

In spite of these

statements, plaintiffs suggest that Madsen does not bar their
claims against Myers and Kesler.

Footnote 5 in Madsen, states,

part:
[W]e express no opinion on the question of
whether a claim against an employee of a
government entity would be barred if the
notice of claim had not been filed but the
entity had a statutory duty to indemnify
the employee.
[658 P.2d at 630]
Prior to a 1983 amendment, the governmental entity's statutory
duty to indemnify its employees arose pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §63-48-1, et. ~· and was applicable only in
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., uations where simple negligence of an employee was involved.
the employee acted with gross negligence, malice or fraud, the
J'wµrnmental entity was relieved of the statutory duty to indem··y.

At all times relevant to the instant case, §63-48-3(4)

No public entity is obligated to pay any
judgment based on a claim against an
officer or employee if it is established
that the officer or employee acted or
failed to act due to gross negligence,
fraud, or malice.
If Madsen stands for the proposition that there can be
110

cause of action for simple negligence against a government

employee, there would be no need for the statement made by the
court in Footnote 5, and there would also be no way to reconcile
the 1978 amendment to §63-30-4 of the Governmental Immunity Act
•ith the indemnity statute.
~adsen

This court clearly recognized in

the statutory duty to indemnify, and made no statement to

the effect that the amendment to §63-30-4 of the Governmental
Immunity Act impliedly repealed the indemnity statute.

However,

i: §63-30-4 abolishes any personal liability for simple negli-

Jenee of a government employee, there could be no situation in
•n1ch the statutory duty to indemnify would arise.

This would

ialate the general principal of statutory construction that
•equ1res construing related statutes in such a way as to give
"d·~,,nable

~yn1zed

and operable effect to both.

Madsen further

the existence of the duty to indemnify and also the

''tent1al for a claim against an employee in Footnote 11, which
.~ates:
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The intent to adopt a new rule for official immunity is further evident in the
1978 amendment to the notice provision,
§63-30-11, which added a provision to the
effect that the service of a notice of
claim upon an employee of a government
entity is not a condition precedent to the
commencement of an action against the
employee, and a further provision that the
entity need not receive a notice of claim
where only the employee was sued, unless
the entity had a statutory duty to indemnify the employee.
(658 P.2d at 633]
Both Footnote 5 and Footnote 11 of Madsen describe a
situation which is present in the instant case.

This case deals

with claims against employees of the state in their individual
capacity.

The claims are for simple negligence only, which gives

rise to the statutory duty to indemnify.

This court stated in

Madsen that it was expressing no opinion on the question of
whether a claim against an employee would be barred if the notice
of claim had not been filed where the entity had a statutory du··
to indemnify.

If there is no basis for a claim or for personal

liability against an employee for simple negligence, there

coul~

be no situation where the statutory duty to indemnify arises.
Thus, plaintiffs suggest that the court has not yet decided the
full extent of the meaning of the amendment to §63-30-4.
Furthermore, any reference in Madsen to the effect of
§63-30-4, as amended, on actions against employees, should be
considered no more than dicta because the defendant in ~ "'
not simply a government employee, but rather a government off'cial, the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Financial
Institutions.

The defendants in the instant case are medical
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_tors who happened to be working for the State of Utah while
, 2 rt1Jrming

B.

services for plaintiffs.
U.C.A. S63-30-4, As Amended, Must Be Given A
Reasonable Interpretation.

In Nelson v. Stoker, et al.,
1 y83),

No.

P.2d

(Utah

18244, filed August 1, 1983, the Supreme Court stated:

'This Court has previously stated that we will not interpret a
statute in such a way that results in an absurdity.• If the 1978
amendment to S63-30-4 is interpreted to mean that there is no
~ersonal
~ence,
1 the

liability of employees of the State for simple negli-

then we are left with the absurd result that an employer

State) can be held liable for the negligent acts of its

employees while the employees themselves cannot be held liable.
Tr.e general, common law rule for holding an employer liable for
·he negligent acts of its employee has been that of agency or
cespondeat superior.
10

~as1s

If an employee is not liable, then there is

in common law for holding the employer liable.

!63-30-4 appears

Yet,

to require that an employer can still be held

cJable even though the employee cannot.

Furthermore, such a

result is absurd because it cannot be reconciled with the indem1it1

statute which provides that a governmental employer can be

~quired

to indemnify its employees for liabilities created by

empt iyees'

simple negligence.

The Utah Supreme Court has previously noted that it
'"'Jl'l be absurd to grant immunity to an employee physician while
1 0~l1ng

the employer liable for that employee's negligence.
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In

Frank v. State, 613 P. 2d 517 (Utah 1980), an action was brought
against the State of Utah claiming negligence of the University
of Utah Medical Center, a staff psychiatrist and a psychologist
with the Salt Lake County Mental Health Department who was
working with the University of Utah Medical Center under a
contractual arrangement.

The trial court granted the defendants'

motion for summary judgment on the ground that all defendants
were protected by the Governmental Immunity Act.

On appeal. the

Utah Supreme Court held that, although the operation of a health
care facility is protected under the Governmental Immunity Act,
such immunity was waived by the government because the injury

was

caused by the negligent act or omission of an employee, and that
the injury did not arise out of the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function.
The Supreme Cou.rt further held that the Governmental
Irmnunity Act does not apply to individuals but only to governmental entities.

The court stated that physician-employees of

governmental entities should not be given absolute immunity from
their medical malpractice.

Finally, the court made the

follow1~

significant statement:
Other reasons for the above holding are
manifest.
For one, it is contrary to
reason to deny governmental immunity to a
public employer and then grant it to. the
very employee allegedly causing the inJury.
Moreover, a grant of immunity in the pre
sent case, would of necessity, shield all
practitioners employed, even under temporary contract from another source, by a
governmental health care facility from any
liability for malpractice.
[emphasis added]
[613 P.2d at 520]
-30-

Although the amendment to S63-30-4 was not applicable to
,,e fa, ~s of Frank v. State,
"' fe' t 1 ve date of

the amended statute, it is nonetheless clear

,at the Utah Supreme Court,

1

because the claim arose prior to the

in 1980, believed it to be unreaso-

.able to grant immunity to a doctor employee of the state whose
·1egligence caused the injuries complained of.

Additionally, the

_0urt obviously considered it unacceptable to immunize stateemployed physicians from any liability for malpractice.

These

statements were made after the effective date of the amendment to
~63-30-4.

Thus,

it is clear that the interpretation given by the

lower court to §63-30-4 is both unreasonable and unfair.

This

:aurt should interpret said statute to preserve the common law
:lairns of plaintiffs against the doctors in their individual
:apacities.

c.

The Trial Court's Interpretation of u.c.A. §63-30-4
Violates Public Policy.

The ramifications of immunizing state-employed physitans

from any personal liability for medical malpractice are

staggering.
"~

If §63-30-4, as amended,

is interpreted to mean that

state employee can be held personally liable for his or her

Simple negligence, then every employee at a state-operated medi•I

•3r1

l1ty, such as the University of Utah Medical Center, is

"h'dutely immune from personal liability for malpractice.
1

The

01; redress available to an injured person is an action against
'1e

state.

In the case of serious injuries, such as in the
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instant case, a suit against the state for a maximum recovery

01

$250,000, based on the 1983 amendment to the Governmental
Immunity Act, is simply not an adequate remedy.

In the case of

plaintiffs' claim, the total possible recovery against the state
is possibly only $100,000 per person, which is well below the
costs necessary to provide care and treatment to plaintiff
Michael Payne.

(See u.c.A. S63-30-29)

The amount of the potential recovery is not the only
reason why §63-30-4 should not be interpreted to eliminate personal liability of physician-employees of the state.

In addi-

tion, a patient's right to bring a malpractice action against a
negligent physician has the meritorious effect of promoting
better health care from physicians.

If §63-30-4 eliminates per-

sonal liability of state employees, then physicians employed by
the state will no longer be concerned about the potential
malpractice claim.

fo~

a

Such a result will certainly not promote the

desirable result of better health care in state-operated facilities in Utah.
Finally, as an alternative,

if the Court were to

interpret §63-30-4 to mean that personal liability of a

stat~

employee is only preserved if the plaintiffs meet the notice
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, plaintiffs

sugges

that the claims of the minor plaintiff Michael Patrick Payne
against Drs. Meyers and Kesler have been properly preserved.
lower court refused to grant summary judgment in favor of the
State as to the minor plaintiff's claims, thus ruling that ~ 15
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.. ms

r1ad been timely filed.

~6l-30-4
il/

The main purpose for the amendment

was to close the loophole in the immunity and indem-

statutory scheme whereby the State could be protected

against liability if the plaintiff failed to meet the Immunity
Ace's notice requirements,

but could still be liable under the

_.·,demn1ty Act if its employee was still personally liable.
_ornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977),

See

(Wilkins' con-

0Jrr1ng opinion); Developments in Utah Law, 1978 Utah L.Rev. 741,
-, "6.

Since,

in the instant case, the claims of the minor

plaintiff against the State have been properly noticed and the
Slate can be held liable, there is no reason to preclude personal
11ao1lity of the physicians because plaintiffs are not using the
- .• 1ms against said physicians as a back-door method of getting
the State.

H

In summary, plaintiffs contend that even if 563-30-4, as
3rnended,

is deemed to apply to the facts of this case, it cannot

ce construed to deny plaintiffs their conunon law right of action
•gainst the individual defendant physicians for their personal
'e~!tgence.
1

1ame~t

On that basis, the lower court's granting of summary

pursuant to §63-30-4 was improper and should be reversed
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POINT III.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED S63-30-4, AS AMENDED,
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As indicated in Point I, supra, if Utah Code Annotated
S63-30-4, as amended, is applied to the facts of the instant
case, such application would give retroactive effect to the
statute because plaintiffs' claims against the defendant doctors
arose prior to the effective date of the amended statute.
ART. I, S7 of the Utah Constitution states:
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law.
In Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co. v. District
Court of Salt Lake County, 99 Utah 527, 104 P.2d 353 (1940), the
defendants argued that an amendment to a portion of the state's
water statutes, if applied retroactively, would deprive defendants of a vested right, and therefore violate the Constitution.
Although the court determined that the amendment to the statute
affected procedure only, and therefore retroactive application
would not deprive defendants of any vested rights, the court made
the following significant statement regarding vested rights of
action:
A vested right in procedure of a court is
quite different from a vested right of
action. With reference to a right of
action it is stated 6 RCL under Title,
'Constitutional Law', . . . as follows:
'A
vested right of action is property in the
same sense in which tangible things are
property, and is equally protected against
arbitrary interference, and whether it
springs from contract or the principles of
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the common law, it is not competent for the
legislature to take it away.'
And this Court has approved and affirmed
this doctrine in the case of Halling v.
Industrial Comm. of Utah, et al., 71 Utah
112, 263 P. 78 • • • •
[104 P.2d at 360)
In addition, applying a statute retroactively to deny a
party of substantive rights of action against governmental
empiJyces has been found to be a denial of due process under the
united States Constitution.
J 73 A. 2d 372 ( D.C.
~63~30-4,

1961).

See Barrick v. Dist. of Columbia,
Thus, retroactive application of

as amended, to the facts of the plaintiffs' claims,

••ould constitute a violation of ART I, S7, of the Utah
Constitution, and also of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Furthermore, ART. I, Sll, of the Utah Constitution
states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him and his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party.
Plaintiffs contend that if §63-30-4 is interpreted to
:_cot,,lly abolish the common law right of action against a state

~mpl0yec for his simple negligence,

'RT.

then the statute violates §11

I because it denies plaintiffs' access to the courts for

- "· Jy by due cour:se of law.

It will undoubtedly be argued by

lefen.Jants that plaintiffs have not been denied access to the
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courts by this statute because there is still a remedy available
against the state.

However, plaintiffs suggest that the qualiti

tive change in their rights is so extensive under S63-30-4, tha·
it is in violation of ART I, Sll.
For example, if the common law right of action against
the employees in their individual capacities is totally abolished, the only possibility plaintiffs have to recover is
against the state and then only if they meet all the rigid
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, such as the oneyear notice provision.

Furthermore, there is a significant

substantive difference between the claim against the state and
the claim against the individual doctors.

Plaintiffs are

possibly limited in their amount of damages to a maximum of
$100, 000 per person under the terms of the Governmental Immunity
Act (U.C.A. S63-30-29), whereas in an action against an individual doctor, no such limitation is present.

With such restric-

tions placed on plaintiffs, they have been effectively denied
their "remedy by due course of law" which is guaranteed them by
ART. I, Sll.
Plaintiffs acknowledge this court's prior decision of
Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref.

&

Mining Co., 13 Utah :u8,

191 P.2d 612 (1948), which may be construed to hold contrary to
plaintiffs' position on this issue.

In response, however, plai,-

tiffs cite to the court the case of Barrick v. Dist. of Colum~
supra, wherein the court explained that the United States Code
affecting governmental liability of the District of Columbia
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was

_1,anged following the date of an accident involving plaintiff and
e Jr i «er of an ambulance employed by the District of Columbia.

:1

vr1,)r

tr1

the amendment to the statute, the District of Columbia

nad complete immunity from liability, but actions could be filed
.ya1nst its employees in their individual capacity for simple
negligence.

The amendment to this statute abolished the liabil-

ltY of the individual employees,

but allowed liability against

the District of Columbia where an emergency vehicle was involved
if the plaintiff could prove gross negligence against the

District of Columbia.

The statute was expressly made to be

retroactive, and on the basis of the application of that statute
to plaintiff's case, a directed verdict was entered in favor of
the District of Columbia because plaintiff could not prove gross
1egligence.

Plaintiff appealed, and the District of Columbia

r0urt held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied
retroactively.
'o lurnb1 a was

One of the arguments raised by the District of

that the retroactive application of the amended sta-

tute did not destroy a vested right because it replaced
?laintiff's original right to sue the employee with a right to
sue the District of Columbia.
t~dl

reasoning.

The court refused to agree with

The court stated:

There might be be some merit to the
13overnment 's argument if the Act merely
affected remedies or procedure. • • • But
the Act does more than that.
As was said
by the court in Weil v. Taxi Cabs of
Cincinnati, 139 Ohio St. 198, 39 N.E. 148,
151, 'If the statute created a right to
compensation which did not theretofore
exist, it was dealing with a new substan-
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tive right, and the fact that the legislation has the effect of extinguishing one
type of right and creating another in lieu
thereof, does not make it remedial legislation as to the rights involved.' • . .
As the effect of the D.C. Employee
Non-Liability Act is to retroactively
divest appellants of their common-law right
of action to recover against the ambulance
driver on proof of ordinary negligence and
allows recovery against the District of
Columbia only on proof of gross negligence,
we are forced to declare that the Act in
its application to the facts of this case
results in an unconstitutional deprivation
of appellants' property right.
[173 A.2d
at 376)
The reasoning of the District of Columbia court is analogous to
plaintiffs' claim that the change in the Governmental Immunity
Act in Utah precludes them adequate access to the courts.
Substituting a more restrictive right for one that was more
liberal, does not preclude the constitutional defective nature

J'

the statute in denying adequate access to the courts.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, states in part, that "no STATE • . . shall
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due pro
cess of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co., supra, sets
forth the general principle in Utah that a vested right of act1°
is property protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.

Plaintiffs have a vested right in their claims

against the individual doctors, said right arising out of the
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,egl igent conduct of the doctors and the obligations incurred by
; 1 nt1ffs

as a result thereof for medical services.

Section

.,_,_ iu-4. 3s amended, takes that right away from plaintiffs.
_,_ 3

-~

The

tute 1s unconstitutional to the extent that it attempts to
e ~hat

,t~perty

right away from the plaintiffs because it denies them
without due process of law.
In Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 78 Utah 39, 300

r

i040 (1931),

the plaintiff brought suit for a violation of

'Jtah 's Blue Sky Law.
~la1ntiff

However, the statute which gave rise to

's claim had been repealed prior to the date plaintiff

l1led her lawsuit.

The statute was in effect at the time of the

'ransaction which gave rise to the claim.

The repeal of the

statute did away with plaintiff's claim under the Blue Sky Laws.
Ihe defendants argued that since the action was commenced after
repeal of the statute, plaintiff had no cause of action.
•

1

•ah Supreme Court disagreed.

The

The court stated:

[H]er right of action was nevertheless
within the protection of the Constitution
and could not be destroyed by legislation •
. It is a vested right, in the nature
of a property right, and ought to be
regarded as property in the sense that
tangible things are property and equally
protected by the Constitution against
arbitrary interference by the Legislature.
[ 300 P. at 1045]
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the statute is
nst1tut1nnal because it denies them equal protection under
l ·~W'S.

nal

The statute makes a classification which has no
'ias1s.

The classification is composed, in the instant
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case, of claimants of employees of state-operated health care
facilities.

Plaintiffs are denied their common law right of

action against physician-defendants simply because those
physician-defendants happened to be working for a governrnenta,
entity at the time they committed malpractice.

Other than the

fact that these physicians worked for a governmental entity,
there is absolutely no difference between them and private phys1·
cians.

Each of the individual physicians in the instant case

carries medical malpractice insurance with a private insurance
carrier, just the same as any private physician practicing in the
state of Utah.

There is no rational basis for allowing these

defendants to avoid personal liability for their malpractice
simply because they were working for a governmental entity.

The

classification made by the statute is discriminatory against
persons who choose, or who may be required, due to the availability of facilities, or their own financial ability, to obtain
their medical services from physicians employed by governmental
entities.
CONCLUSION
The lower court's summary judgment dismissing
plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants Myers and
Kesler should be reversed and the case remanded for trial on t!,e
issue of those defendants' negligence and liability to pla1nt

1

~

for the following reasons:
1.

The lower court's application of Utah Code AnnotJI~
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,,

i0-4, as amended, to the facts of this case to abolish all

Ptsonal

liability of governmental employees,

0 ~ pld111liffs'
0 1

is improper because

substantive rights vested and causes of action

'oe µrior to the effective date of the amended statute, and the

_, ••ute cannot be applied retroactively to abolish plaintiffs'
-laims against the individual physician-defendants.
2.

Even if S63-30-4 is applicable to the facts of this

case, it cannot be interpreted to abolish common law causes of
action for medical malpractice against individual defendant phys1~ians

such as those involved in this case.

It is contrary to

proper and reasonable statutory interpretation, and is also
contrary to policy to interpret that statute to mean that indivirlual employees of the state are totally immune from liability for
their own negligence.
3.
~laintif

Application of §63-30-4 to abolish the claims of

fs against the individual defendant physicians is

J11const1tutional under ART. I, §§7 and 11 of the Utah
'onstitution and also under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
united States Constitution because it denies the plaintiffs ade1uate remedies for the wrongs committed against them and also
~ecause

it denies them their property without due process of law

ind also denies them equal protection under the laws.

-41-

Respectfully submitted this

~ay

of September,

1983.
STRONG & HANNI
By

R'ocottwtl'.ams

Stuart H. Schultz
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this

~ay

of September,

1983, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellants were hand delivered to the following:
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.
Francis J. Carney, Esq.
SUITTER, AXLAND & ARMSTRONG
Attorneys for Defendant Kesler
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City,Utah 84101
Craig L. Bar low
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for State Defendants
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Gary D. Stott, Esq.
Nelson L. Hayes
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

-42-

William S. Quigley, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Co-Counsel for Defendant Myers
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Arthur H. Nielson, Esq.
Co-Counsel for Defendant Myers
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Steven J. Sorenson, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Co-Counsel for Defendant Kesler
115 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

-43-

